Abstract

This article interrogates the contemporary relevance of UNCLOS Articles 125 and 126 on the rights of landlocked States to access and utilize the sea, situating Uganda’s recent assertions of historical linkage to the Indian Ocean within a broader doctrinal and jurisprudential context. By comparing Uganda’s prospective invocation of UNCLOS with the International Court of Justice’s 2018 decision in Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v Chile), the article assesses the limits of international law in restructuring geographical disadvantage. Through political, legal, and economic analysis, the article argues that while UNCLOS provides a robust regime of transit rights, it does not create a right to sovereign maritime territory. The Bolivian precedent underscores the challenge of transforming diplomatic expectations into binding obligations. Uganda’s situation, however, differs in important structural ways, offering new strategic legal pathways that avoid Bolivia’s doctrinal pitfalls.

1. Introduction

On 12^th November, 2025, President Yoweri Museveni publicly asserted that Uganda “shares part of the Indian Ocean,” reviving a dormant strategic conversation on Uganda’s maritime future. While largely rhetorical, the statement attracted significant regional attention, raising the possibility that Uganda may seek to operationalize its rights under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a landlocked State. This essay situates Uganda’s position within the normative framework of UNCLOS Articles 125–126 and contrasts it with the ICJ’s seminal judgment in Bolivia v Chile (2018), where the Court rejected Bolivia’s claim to a legal obligation upon Chile to negotiate sovereign ocean access.

Uganda, like many landlocked States, bears the developmental, geopolitical, and logistical burdens of geographical confinement. Yet unlike Bolivia’s century-long aspiration for a sovereign corridor to the Pacific, Uganda’s concerns are less about sovereignty and more about economic optimization of transit access, an area where UNCLOS provides clearer, more justiciable entitlements.

2. The Doctrinal Framework: UNCLOS Articles 125 and 126

2.1 Article 125: The Right of Access and Freedom of Transit

UNCLOS Article 125 establishes that:

“Landlocked States shall have the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose of exercising the rights provided for in the Convention… Freedom of transit shall be granted by all States of transit by all means of transport.”

Three doctrinal principles emerge:

1. A guaranteed right, not merely a privilege;
2. Transit States retain regulatory discretion, provided it is not exercised arbitrarily;
3. The right is functional, not territorial: it ensures interaction with the international maritime domain but does not create sovereignty over a corridor or port.

2.2 Article 126: Economic Equality

Article 126 reinforces economic non-discrimination:

“Landlocked States shall enjoy freedom of transit… without being subject to any duties, taxes or charges other than charges for specific services rendered.”

The provision aims to mitigate the economic disadvantages of landlockedness by prohibiting discriminatory transit regimes.

Uganda already benefits from these provisions through Kenya and Tanzania, although disputes occasionally arise over non-tariff barriers, infrastructural asymmetries, and administrative bottlenecks.

3. The Bolivia v Chile Judgment (2018): Limits of Custom and Expectation

The ICJ judgment is pivotal for understanding what international law does not provide to landlocked States. Bolivia argued that Chile was legally obliged to negotiate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean due to:

1. Bilateral instruments (1920 Acta Protocolizada, 1950 diplomatic notes, 1975 Charaña Declaration)
2. Unilateral commitments by Chilean officials,
3. Regional diplomatic frameworks (OAS Resolutions), and
4. Legitimate expectations arising from past conduct.

The ICJ rejected all these grounds, holding that:

1. Expressions of willingness do not create binding obligations unless formulated with clear intention;
2. Legitimate expectations are not an independent source of obligations in general international law;
3. No rule of customary international law requires a coastal State to negotiate sovereign access with a landlocked neighbor.

The Court distinguished between:

1. Sovereign access, which is territorial and exceptional, and
2. Functional access, which is protected and widespread.

Bolivia, therefore, enjoyed transit rights but not the right to compel Chile to surrender territory or negotiate towards sovereignty.

4. Comparative Analysis: Uganda’s Position in Light of the Bolivian Precedent

4.1 Key Differences Between Uganda and Bolivia

Uganda is not seeking sovereign maritime territory. Instead, it seeks:

1. Strengthened implementation of transit rights,
2. Potential special economic corridors,
3. Improved port access regimes (Mombasa, Dar-es Salaam, Tanga, Bagamoyo), and
4. Possible maritime logistical hubs linked through the Northern and Central Corridors.

Thus, Uganda’s legal aspirations align squarely with UNCLOS functional rights, which are enforceable and widely recognized.

Bolivia, by contrast, pursued an exceptional territorial remedy, which international law is hesitant to compel.

4.2 Could Uganda Invoke Articles 125–126 Against Kenya or Tanzania?

The precise answer is Yes-but only to enforce freedom of transit, not to demand maritime territory. Uganda could argue the following:

1. Any administrative barriers, excessive charges, or discriminatory practices violate Article 126.
2. Unreasonable delays, bureaucratic obstacles, or infrastructure closures could breach Article 125.
3. Negotiation of special transit arrangements (e.g., dry ports, bonded corridors) is consistent with Article 125(2).

Unlike Bolivia, Uganda would not need to rely on:

1. Estoppel,
2. Acquiescence,
3. Unilateral declarations, or
4. Diplomatic history.

UNCLOS provides a direct treaty basis under Art. 125 & 126.

4.3 Political and Economic Dimensions

Politically:

1. Uganda’s renewed “Indian Ocean identity” signals a desire for greater regional maritime agency.
2. It strengthens Uganda’s bargaining posture within the EAC and IGAD frameworks.
3. It allows Uganda to pursue logistical diversification, reducing overdependence on the Mombasa corridor.

Legally:

1. Uganda has a justiciable right to challenge excessive charges or discriminatory practices.
2. But Uganda cannot compel Kenya, Tanzania, or any coastal State to surrender maritime territory.
3. Any claim must remain within the functional access paradigm.

Economically:

1. Improved transit access reduces transport costs, which currently increase Uganda’s import/export expenses by up to 30–40%.
2. Maritime connectivity is central to:

1. 1. Uganda’s oil export future,
   2. Regional agro-export competitiveness,
   3. Emerging manufacturing corridors (Gulu–Atiak–Juba; Kampala–Mpondwe–Kasindi).

5. What Uganda Can Learn from Bolivia

The Bolivian case teaches three critical lessons:

1. Historical narratives and political rhetoric cannot create legal obligations: Uganda must therefore ground its claims strictly within treaty law, not ancestral references to pre-colonial trade routes.
2. Diplomatic goodwill does not equate to binding commitments: Negotiations for special corridors must be formalized through treaty instruments (e.g., dry port agreements).
3. International law does not transform landlocked States into coastal States: The legal imagination must remain realistic: the goal is efficient maritime access, not territorial restitution.

6. Conclusion

Uganda’s potential invocation of UNCLOS Articles 125–126 represents a pragmatic, legally grounded strategy for enhancing maritime connectivity. Unlike Bolivia’s attempt to convert diplomatic history into a territorial obligation, Uganda can rely on clear treaty rights that require coastal neighbors to facilitate non-discriminatory transit.

Politically, Uganda’s renewed maritime rhetoric reflects an aspiration for regional assertiveness; economically, it may catalyze more efficient trade corridors; legally, it situates Uganda within a robust framework that avoids the pitfalls of the Bolivian approach.

The lesson from Bolivia v Chile is clear: international law privileges functional access over territorial transformation. Uganda’s challenge and opportunity, is to leverage the tools available under UNCLOS to secure enhanced economic and logistical integration with the Indian Ocean, not through claims of historical sovereignty, but through enforceable rights of transit in a globalized legal order.

References:

1. United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) arts 125–126.
2. Y K Museveni, Radio Address, Mbale State Lodge (9 November 2025), Daily Monitor (10 November 2025).
3. International Court of Justice, Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v Chile), Judgment of 1 October 2018.
4. K Uprety, ‘Freedom of Transit and the Right of Access for Land-locked States’ (World Bank, Transit and Trade Facilitation Series).
5. EJIL: Talk, ‘Ethiopia’s Negotiations on Access to the Sea: Can International Law Help Find a Solution?’ (27 February 2024).

By Rugambwa Isaac